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Russia's New Military Doctrine
By KEITH ARMES
[The following article contains excerpts from an interview with Maj. Gen. Yuri Ya. 
Kirshin, former head of the Strategic Department, USSR Armed Forces General Staff by 
Keith Armes, editor of Perspective.]
Perspective: The text of the Military Doctrine that is available is only a published 
"account" ( izlozhenie) of the original text of the document with major omissions--
according to one report, a total of five pages are missing. This incomplete 
paraphrase of the doctrine, promulgated by President Yel'tsin on November 2, 
1993, on the basis of the text prepared by the Security Council, provides for the 
president as Commander-in-Chief to exercise general direction (obshchee 
rukovodstvo) of the armed forces and other forces of the Russian Federation, 
while the Council of Ministers-Government bears responsibility for the condition 
of the armed forces, and the Minister of Defense carries out immediate direction 
of the armed forces. The published text does not provide for the creation of 
parliamentary bodies to implement a "system of civilian control of the activity and 
the use of the military force of the Russian state. "
Do you believe that the provisions of the doctrine provide adequately for civilian 
control of the armed forces?
... The creation of a system of civilian control of military policy and the armed forces is 
under way. Problems of civilian control are reflected in the new constitution and in the 
"Law on Defense." In these documents the functions of the President, the Council of 
Ministers, the Parliament, the Minister of Defense and the General Staff are all defined.
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The military doctrine itself consists of a system of guidelines on the sources of military 
danger, the missions entrusted to the state in the area of national security, the missions 
of the armed forces, and the principles in accordance with which the armed forces are 
to be structured and employed. The military doctrine is not supposed to define a system 
of civilian control. Nevertheless, some principles relating to civilian control in fact are 
reflected in the military doctrine (e.g., the interaction of the military administration with 
public and religious organizations, the prohibition of the activity of political parties and 
movements within the armed forces, openness in relations with the public and the mass 
media, relations with Federation "subjects" [Russian Federation republics and regions] 
and local administration bodies.)
... A fully developed system of civilian control of the army is only in the process of being 
created, but there can be no doubt that ultimately such a system will be established. 
Certainly, a commission or committee of the Duma will be formed that will be 
responsible for national security issues and the armed forces.(2) The functions of the 
commission will include issues of civilian control.
The head of the Russian government plays a major role in the control of the armed 
forces. This role is described in detail in the "Law on Defense." It should be noted that at 
the same time the head of the government is a member of the Security Council. At the 
present time, Russian experts are discussing the desirability of creating the post of Vice 
Prime Minister, who would then be responsible for the so-called "power ministries," 
which include the Ministry of Defense. If such a post is indeed established, the role of 
the head of the government will only become more important.
Would it be possible to have a civilian Minister of Defense in Russia? In the past, 
Russian ministers of defense have always been drawn from the professional military. 
However, it is possible that this tradition will be broken in the future, with the result that 
the new Russia will have a civilian Minister of Defense...
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However, in my view at the present time it is highly advisable that the Minister of 
Defense be a military professional. Essentially, what is taking place in Russia at the 
moment is not so much a military reform as the creation of a new army. To head this 
new army a person is needed who knows all the armed services intimately. Moreover, 
as yet there are very few civilians in Russia who have a sound grasp of military issues 
or strategy.
Perspective: If has been suggested that the nuclear provisions of the published 
paraphrase of the military doctrine that leave open the possibility of first use of 
nuclear weapons by Russia if certain conditions are not met are intended: 1) to 
encourage Ukraine to dismantle or transfer to Russia is nuclear weapons; and 2) 
to deter the East European (former Warsaw Pact) nations from joining NATO, 
since in this case they would be allied with nuclear powers. What is your view of 
the intended effect of the provisions regarding nuclear weaponry?
. . . According to the military doctrine, there are two cases in which Russia may use 
nuclear weapons against another state that itself does not possess nuclear weapons... 
The aim of Russia's nuclear policy is not to produce new nuclear weapons directed 
against non-nuclear states, and even less to employ such weaponry. Instead, the goal 
of national policy is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear 
weapons by means of deterring any unleashing of aggression against the Russian 
Federation. This principle embodied in the military doctrine magnifies the effectiveness 
of nuclear weapons as a political deterrent against possible aggression. . .
The principles relating to the use of nuclear weapons laid down in the military doctrine 
are not intended to encourage Ukraine to dismantle its nuclear weapons or to transfer 
them to Russia. It is true that serious conflicts have arisen between Russia and Ukraine, 
including in the area of nuclear policy. However, these disputes undoubtedly will be 
resolved by political means, without the use of armed force--least of all nuclear 
weapons.
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The provisions contained in the military doctrine are not aimed at deterring the East 
European states from becoming members of NATO on the grounds that were they to do 
so they would then be allied with nuclear powers. We do not deny the right of these 
states to make arrangements for their own security.(3) Further, Russia does not regard 
any of the East European states as a possible opponent. However, let us make the 
most unlikely assumption that one of these countries commits an act of aggression. I do 
not believe that there is a single madman or eccentric to be found in Russia who would 
admit the possibility that Russia, with her vast population and mighty army, would use 
nuclear weapons to defend herself against any of the East European nations.
Military Blocs
Perspective: The expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the 
interests of Russian Federation military security is also referred to in the 
published account of the doctrine as a source of military danger. If East European 
countries were to conclude an association with NATO (in accordance with their 
proclaimed desire) evidently they could be considered as coming under this 
provision (this interpretation appears to be confirmed by the strong warnings 
expressed by Foreign Intelligence Service(SVR)director Yevgeni Primakov and 
the recent SVR report "Perspectives of the Expansion of NATO and the Interests 
of Russia" ).
The implications of the formulation in the curtailed paraphrase of the doctrine 
seem to go considerably beyond the views on the undesirability of the expansion 
of NATO advanced by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID). Does this 
suggest a difference of views between the Security Council (where the "power 
ministries" play a dominant role) and MID?
According to the military doctrine, the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the 
detriment of Russian security interests constitutes a source of military danger. Our 
military doctrine is based on the principle that NATO is not a source of military danger 
4
for Russia. An expansion of NATO as a consequence of East European states joining 
the alliance will not change this situation: An enlarged NATO still will not constitute a 
source of military danger for Russia.
Europe needs a new security system. A NATO that has been expanded to include the 
East European states will not resolve the problems of European security. Principally, the 
solution of these problems is to be found within the framework of the UN and the CSCE. 
At the same time, while an expansion of NATO would not represent a military danger for 
Russia, objectively it would cause Russia political and economic harm, and to a certain 
degree it would also contribute to the isolation of Russia in the European region.
With regard to this, there is a further very important aspect that needs to be taken into 
consideration. The military doctrine defines not only possible sources of military danger, 
but also factors that may contribute to a military danger developing into an immediate 
military threat to Russia. Individual consideration of each of these factors makes it 
possible to carry out a more profound analysis of a given military-political situation.
It is certainly true that an expansion of military blocs to the detriment of Russia's security 
interests constitutes a source of military danger. Such a source of military danger may 
represent an immediate military threat in the following eases: 1) if a massing of armed 
forces occurs on Russia's borders;2)if border conflicts arise or armed provocations are 
incited; 3) if foreign forces are introduced into the territory of foreign states contiguous 
with Russia. Given the above criteria, it is not difficult to define situations in which the 
expansion of military blocs and alliances may affect Russia's military security.
...It should be borne in mind that the possible expansion of NATO continues to be a 
subject of discussion in Russia, while at the same time NATO itself; has not yet 
determined its policy on the issue. Consequently, there is nothing surprising about the 
fact that some Russian politicians and military officers hold differing views on particular 
aspects.
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Perspective: One of the principal existing and potential sources of external 
military danger referred to in the published version of the military doctrine is the 
suppression of the "rights, liberties and legitimate interests" of Russian 
Federation citizens in foreign states. Some commentators have seen this very 
broad formulation as providing carte blanche for armed intervention against 
states of the "Near Abroad" that are seen as discriminating against Russian 
residents. Attention has been drawn to proposals that Russian-speakers in the 
Near Abroad receive dual citizenship--so that by definition they would be Russian 
citizens.
An earlier draft of the doctrine (published in Voennaya mysl' )referred to the 
violation of the rights of "persons who identify themselves ethnically and 
culturally with (Russia) in the former republics of the USSR " as a possible source 
of war .
Could you comment on whether the original draft text published in Voennaya 
mysl' may have provided the basis for the complete uncensored text of the 
doctrine? Can you confirm the accuracy of the account of the doctrine in the 
article by V. Petrovsky (mentioned in footnote 1) which cites the statement that 
"Russia has the right to undertake measures of defense appropriate to the 
threat...[measures] even of a military character...[in regions] of dense residence of 
the Russian-speaking population outside of the territory of Russia."
It is true that according to the doctrine the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and 
legitimate interests of citizens(4) of the Russian Federation in foreign states is 
considered to be a source of military danger. This doctrinal principle is intended to cool 
down nationalist hotheads who violate internationally recognized human rights. This is 
not something new that we have [invented]. Powerful civilized countries have taken this 
approach.(5) However, this does not mean that the Russian military is being given carte 
blanche for military intervention against states of the near abroad which, in the view of 
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some foreign commentators, discriminate against Russian residents. Russian law gives 
the military leadership no such rights. These issues are to be decided by the politicians.
Russians in the Near Abroad
The military doctrine does not provide for the Russian speaking population in the states 
of the near abroad to be protected by the Russian armed forces.(6) Nor is anything said 
about this in the unpublished portions of the doctrine. If the need arises for the 
protection of the Russian-speaking population, there are two means of achieving this: 
first, action undertaken by the UN and the CSCE; second, political and economic action 
taken by Russia herself.
Perspective: The situations referred to in the published account of the doctrine in 
which the armed forces can be employed for the suppression of internal conflicts 
appear to give very broad scope for their use, i.e., internal conflicts and other 
actions with the use of means of armed force on the territory of the Russian 
Federation threatening its territorial integrity, other interests of society and of 
Russian (rossiiskikh)citizens. Has such a broad formulation encountered 
resistance within the army in view of the reluctance of many senior officers to see 
the army used in internal political conflicts? Is it correct that many generals were 
strongly opposed to formalizing internal functions for the army in the military 
doctrine and hold that exclusively MVD and internal troop special subunits 
should fulfill this role?
The only restriction in the published account of the doctrine on decisions 
regarding the use of troops in connection with internal conflicts is that it be 
according to a procedure (poryadok) established by the legislation in force. 
Would it not have been desirable to provide that a precondition for the 
employment of troops would be the presidential proclamation of a state of 
emergency (chrezvychainoe polozhenie), in accordance with appropriate 
legislation, possibly including a provision that such employment of troops be 
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approved within a fixed period of time by a stipulated majority of the Federation 
Council and/or Duma ?
... Russia's national interest is to build a democratic, lawbased, peace-loving state 
based on a variety of different forms of property ownership. However, Russia is 
confronted with obstacles that may hinder achievement of these goals-- notably, both 
internal and external threats. At the present time, for Russia the internal threats are 
more dangerous than the external threats. These internal threats are also of different 
kinds, including military threats.
First, some of the Russian opposition political parties and movements (e.g., the radical 
communists and the profascist organizations) want to achieve power by the use of 
armed force. Second, these political forces possess a social base in the country (as do 
various nationalist and separatist groups). Third, the radical opposition has weaponry at 
its disposal and controls armed units, as well as possessing its own "generals," such as 
Achalov and Makashov, etc. Fourth, the radical opposition relies on the theory of force, 
embodied in various different forms, from the Black Hundreds that originally arose under 
Nicholas II to violence of the Marxist-Leninist variety. In fact, the ideology of force has 
penetrated deep into the consciousness of large numbers of people.
There is the recognition that democracy should be protected by peaceful political 
means--that such peaceful methods must constitute the principal instruments to be 
employed. However, in the case of the use of armed force by the radical political 
opposition, peaceful means may prove to be insufficient. As a result, the democrats may 
be compelled to respond to the use of armed force by employing military units. 
However, if such recourse to the military proves necessary, the following principles must 
be observed:
• Clearly written legislation must be adopted dealing with the use of armed force on 
the part of the political opposition, as well as the employment of the army in such 
situations;
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• The civilian control of the army must be assured;
• The army must not be used in the interests of individual political parties or regional 
"subjects" of the Russian Federation;
• The army's performance of internal functions must be temporary, i .e., solely for the 
duration of a transitional period; ~ As a rule, any action undertaken by Russian 
army units should be reactive in nature and also appropriate in view of the nature 
of the actions of the opposition.
• The troops to be used for armed combat against the opposition need to be properly 
trained in order to ensure that civil war is avoided, as well as to reduce to a 
minimum the losses suffered by both sides. 
Indeed, there was psychological resistance on the part of generals and other officers to 
the use of the military for domestic functions. There are several reasons for this. First, 
as a result of Gorbachev and his team giving orders for the shooting of peaceful 
civilians, the army suffers from the "Vilnius, Tbilisi, Baku syndrome." The actions that 
were undertaken in these cities resulted in great damage to the Soviet Army' s prestige 
in the eyes of the people. Second, the generals and other officers do not possess the 
skills required for the suppression of internal uprisings and disorders. Third, the officer 
corps overestimated the capabilities of the MVD internal forces. Fourth, the officer corps 
was inhibited by the absence of clear comprehensive legislation regarding the army's 
internal functions.
I believe that, as a result of the adoption of the new constitution, approval of the military 
doctrine, and a revision of the "Law on Defense," everything will fall into place. 
Generals, officers and enlisted men will all grasp the need for the armed defense of 
democracy in Russia, should the radical opposition use armed force against it...
Perspective: With regard to the localization and termination of internal conflicts, 
attention has been drawn to the breadth of the definition of forces that may be 
employed, according to the published portions of the doctrine, i.e., individual 
(otdel'nye)formations of the armed forces and troops of the Russian Federation. 
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This could include formations of divisional strength or larger, airborne assault 
and armored units, etc. Do you find that this absence of any restrictions on the 
size or composition of forces is appropriate?
I believe that specifically military questions and methods of combating the armed radical 
opposition will be decided by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. 
Unquestionably, they will determine appropriate limits to be placed on the size and 
composition of the forces that may be employed.
Perspective: Some commentators have claimed that the vital role played by the 
military during the October events enabled the army to insist that broad 
provisions justifying employment of the army in internal conflicts be included in 
the doctrine as a "pay off for services rendered ... " Do you agree with this view?
I disagree. The internal functions of the army must be determined by the threats which I 
discussed earlier. The use of the army within Russia does not represent an aim in itself. 
The employment of the military domestically was a measure to which the country was 
compelled to resort, and it was undertaken with the goals of assuring political stability 
and of building a new Russia. Accordingly, neither Yel'tsin nor Chernomyrdin paid the 
army anything "for services rendered." During the October events, the missions that the 
army fulfilled were in the interests of the new Russia--and consequently in its own 
interests.
Of course, all of this now needs to be properly explained, not only to the Russian people 
themselves, but also to world public opinion.
Notes:
1 See V. Petrovsky, "What Will Russia's Military Doctrine Be Like," Rossiiskie vesti, 26 
October 1993, p. 2
2 These two committees have now been established in the Duma. 3 While President 
Yel'tsin used similar language in August 1993 concerning possible Polish and Czech 
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accession to NATO, subsequently the Russian Foreign Ministry and the president, in a 
policy reversal, in essence vetoed any such NATO membership for former Warsaw Pact 
members.
4 In this context, publications on Russian military doctrine since 1992 have referred 
variously to "ethnic Russians," "Russian speakers," and "Russian citizens," although 
these terms are not interchangeable.
5 The US and European powers in recent decades occasionally have taken armed 
action when the lives of their citizens were at risk or had already been lost, but no such 
intervention in the post-World War II period seems to be on record to prevent "the 
suppression of the rights, freedoms, or legitimate interests" of such citizens.
6 The Foreign Policy Doctrine Promulgated in April 1993 and the Military Doctrine draft 
of 1992 specifically refer to the use of Russian military power in support of ethnic 
Russians in the "Near Abroad," and the question is whether the Military Doctrine 
promulgated recently maintains or changes this approach.
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